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 NOTE 
The Eighth Circuit Further Complicates 
Plaintiff Standing in Data Breach Cases 
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017) 
Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2017) 
Aaron Wynhausen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mass data breaches are a symptom of the digital era and occur with in-
creasing frequency.  In the past decade, nearly every sector of the economy has 
experienced a major breach of personal data, including finance, healthcare, re-
tail, government, hospitality, media, and technology.1  Breaches affect con-
sumer data, government agencies, voting rolls, healthcare providers, scientific 
data, business records and trade secrets, attorney work-product, and nearly eve-
rything else digital.2  Fiascos surrounding poor data stewardship at companies, 
like Facebook and Equifax, are frequently featured in national media.3 
As large data caches containing sensitive personally identifiable infor-
mation continue to expand, the chances for a breach grow in kind.  The poten-
tial harm from a breach varies depending on the type of data compromised.  
Breaches of the most sensitive data, such as social security numbers, embar-
rassing personal information, medical information, and bank account infor-
mation, can lead to mass disruptions in people’s lives.  Breaches of less sensi-
tive data, such as credit card information, online account login credentials, 
email addresses, home addresses, and phone numbers have less potential for 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2019.  Thank you to Courtney 
Lock, Lauren Vincent, David Rogers, Connor Smith, and Professor Dennis Crouch for 
their edits and comments to this Note. 
 1. See, e.g., BAKERHOSTETLER, IS YOUR ORGANIZATION COMPROMISE READY?: 
2016 DATA SECURITY  INCIDENT RESPONSE REPORT 1–2 (2016), https://www.baker-
law.com/files/uploads/Documents/Privacy/2016-Data-Security-Incident-Response-
Report.pdf. 
 2. See, e.g., id. at 2. 
 3. See, e.g., Mike Isaac & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Security Breach Exposes 
Accounts of 50 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/09/28/technology/facebook-hack-data-breach.html; Brian Fung, 
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direct harm but can have frustrating consequences for those whose data is com-
promised.  No uniform federal law exists governing the legal duties of those 
who collect and store personally identifiable information (“PII”), and when a 
breach occurs, the difficulty in identifying actual harm or quantifying a remedy 
makes the appropriate legal response unclear. 
In 2016, reported data breaches increased to a record 1,093 incidents – 
exposing over thirty-six million identified records.4  Some estimates suggest 
that between eighty to ninety percent of Fortune 500 companies and govern-
ment agencies have experienced a data security breach.5  The proliferation of 
data breaches led one federal judge to note that “[t]here are only two types of 
companies left in the United States[] according to data security experts: ‘those 
that have been hacked and those that don’t know they’ve been hacked.’”6  In-
fluential digital security expert Brian Krebs summed up the phenomenon in a 
blog post identifying the “immutable truths” about data breaches: 
There are some fairly simple, immutable truths that each of us should 
keep in mind, truths that apply equally to political parties, organizations 
and corporations alike: [(1)] If you connect to the Internet, someone will 
try to hack it.  [(2)] If what you put on the Internet has value, someone 
will invest time and effort to steal it.  [(3)] Even if what is stolen does 
not have immediate value to the thief, he can easily find buyers for it.  
[(4)] The price he secures for it will almost certainly be a tiny slice of 
its true worth to the victim.  [(5)] Organizations and individuals unwill-
ing to spend a small fraction of what those assets are worth to secure 
them against cybercrooks can expect to eventually be relieved of said 
assets.7 
Plaintiffs have brought hundreds of class action lawsuits against organi-
zations that were responsible for maintaining customer PII and subsequently 
suffered a breach.8  While data breach cases have been litigated in nearly every 
 
 4. IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., DATA BREACH REPORTS: 2016 END OF YEAR 
REPORT 4 (2017), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/2016/DataBreachRe-
port_2016.pdf. 
 5. Miles L. Galbraith, Comment, Identity Crisis: Seeking a Unified Approach to 
Plaintiff Standing for Data Security Breaches of Sensitive Personal Information, 62 
AM. U. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (2013). 
 6. Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 360 (M.D. Pa. 2015)  (quoting 
Nicole Perlroth, The Year in Hacking, by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Apr. 22, 
2013, 9:10 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/22/the-year-in-hacking-by-the-
numbers/). 
 7. Brian Krebs, Krebs’s Immutable Truths About Data Breaches, KREBS ON 
SECURITY (Jan. 9, 2017), https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/01/krebss-immutable-
truths-about-data-breaches/. 
 8. See, e.g., Hayley Tsukayama, Equifax Faces Hundreds of Class-Action Law-
suits and an SEC Subpoena over the Way It Handled Its Data Breach, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
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federal circuit court, each circuit has treated them differently with respect to 
standing and whether a claim for damages exists.9  Most of these cases are 
appealed on standing issues.10  This Note examines two recent cases from the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and analyzes how these decisions 
fit into the greater scheme of data breach litigation in the United States today. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This Note examines two cases from the Eighth Circuit, both dealing with 
the same general issue – an unauthorized breach of consumer data.  Each class 
action was consolidated to a district court within the Eighth Circuit, dismissed 
for lack of standing, and appealed by the plaintiffs to separate panels.11  The 
appellate decisions were released just nine days apart.12  The type of breach 
was unique in each case, and the plaintiffs claimed different types of injuries, 
but the legal issue on appeal remained the same – did the plaintiffs sufficiently 
allege an injury in fact for purposes of establishing Article III standing?  This 
Part summarizes the facts and provides a brief procedural history of each case. 
A. Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc.: Decided August 21, 201713 
The first of the two cases decided by the Eighth Circuit involved hackers 
accessing the customer database of Scottrade, a securities brokerage firm head-
quartered in St. Louis, Missouri.14  Between September 2013 and February 
2014, the hackers acquired PII of over 4.6 million customers.15  The hackers 
then used this data to operate a stock manipulation scheme, a dozen illegal in-
ternet gambling websites, and even a Bitcoin exchange.16  Scottrade was una-
ware of the breach until August 2015, when the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(“FBI”) notified Scottrade that the breach had occurred.17  Scottrade began no-
tifying affected customers through email and mail on October 2, 2015, and 
suggested customers be “vigilant” for signs of fraud for the next two years.18  




 9. See discussion infra Part III. 
 10. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 11. See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 2017); Kuhns v. Scot-
trade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711, 714 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 12. See In re SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 763; Kuhns, 868 F.3d at 711. 
 13. 868 F.3d at 711. 
 14. Id. at 713. 
 15. Id. at 713–14. 
 16. Id. at 714. 
 17. Id. at 715. 
 18. Id.; Duqum v. Scottrade, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-1537-SPM, 2016 WL 3683001, at 
*1 (E.D. Mo. July 12, 2016), aff’d sub nom. Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711 (8th 
Cir. 2017). 
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and protection services ‘with no enrollment required’” and offered one year of 
free credit monitoring and identity theft insurance.19 
When customers signed up for an account with Scottrade, they provided 
PII in the form of names, addresses, social security numbers, tax identification 
numbers, telephone numbers, email addresses, employer information, and 
work history.20  A “Privacy Policy and Security Statement” was included in 
the agreement made with customers.21  In the Privacy Policy, Scottrade 
claimed that it would “maintain physical, electronic and procedural safeguards 
. . . to guard . . . nonpublic personal information” and that it “offer[ed] a secure 
server and password-protected environment . . . protected by . . . encryption.”22  
Scottrade also made two separate representations online that contained similar 
language.23 
After the announcement of the breach, several customers (“Plaintiffs,” 
collectively) filed four separate punitive class action complaints in three federal 
district courts.24  The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri 
consolidated the actions into its jurisdiction.25  The four named Plaintiffs filed 
a consolidated class action seeking a certification of the class, damages for ten 
causes of action,26 injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs.27  The dis-
trict court refused to consider the merits of the case and dismissed the case 
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.28  The court dismissed 
because Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient injuries to satisfy Article III stand-
ing requirements.29  Only one named Plaintiff, Matthew Kuhns, appealed; and 
the main question on appeal was whether his claimed injuries were sufficient 
to satisfy Article III standing.30  Scottrade cross-appealed, claiming that even 
if Kuhns had standing, he had not pleaded sufficient facts for which relief could 
be granted.31 
 
 19. Kuhns, 868 F.3d at 715. 
 20. Id. at 714. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Duqum v. Scottrade, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-1537-SPM, 2016 WL 3683001, at *1 
(E.D. Mo. July 12, 2016), aff’d sub nom. Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711 (8th 
Cir. 2017). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Those causes of action included: breach of contract, breach of implied con-
tract, negligence, unjust enrichment, declaratory relief, and violations of multiple state 
statutes.  Id. at *2. 
 27. Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 2, Duqum, 2016 WL 3683001, (No 
4:11-cv-01537-SPM), 2016 WL 8459371. 
 28. Duqum, 2016 WL 3683001, at *8. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Kuhns, 868 F.3d at 715. 
 31. Id. at 714. 
4
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Kuhns argued that “Scottrade provided deficient cybersecurity in viola-
tion of its ‘contractual and other obligations.’”32  He claimed that because of 
that deficiency, he “faced an immediate and continuing increased risk of iden-
tity theft,” incurred costs from monitoring personal accounts to mitigate risk of 
fraud, received diminished value of services from Scottrade, overpaid for di-
minished services, suffered a decline in value of his PII, and suffered an inva-
sion of privacy.33 
Scottrade argued that Kuhns failed to establish “‘concrete facts’ sufficient 
to plausibly suggest a certainly impending risk of future identity theft” result-
ing from the hack.34  Regarding the “diminished value” claim, Scottrade argued 
that the fees paid were to execute stock trades – which were faithfully executed 
– and therefore there was no breach of contract and Kuhns received the full 
“benefit of the bargain.”35  Scottrade further argued that even if the Eighth Cir-
cuit were to find standing, it should dismiss the case for failure to state a claim 
for which relief could be granted because no actual monetary damages could 
be identified.36 
The Eighth Circuit held that Kuhns had standing based on his contract 
claims, reasoning that customers “did not receive the full benefit of [the] bar-
gain” and “received brokerage services of [a] lesser value” when their PII was 
compromised.37  The Eighth Circuit found that Scottrade breached the contract 
by failing to provide “promised reasonable safeguards” contained within a pri-
vacy policy, which, in turn, caused Kuhns to suffer injury in fact sufficient to 
confer standing.38  However, the court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice 
because Kuhns failed to plausibly allege “actual damages” in the breach of 
contract.39 
B. In re SuperValu, Inc.: Decided August 30, 201740 
The second of the two cases decided by the Eighth Circuit involved the 
theft of customer financial information from major grocery store chains after 
hackers installed malicious software on point-of-sale devices in over 1,000 
stores.41  From June 22, 2014, to July 17, 2014, hackers gained access to the 
computer network that SuperValu used to process credit and debit card trans-
actions.42  The hackers installed software on that network, which allowed them 
 
 32. Id. at 715. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Scottrade, Inc.’s Principal and Response 
Brief at 31, Kuhns, 868 F.3d 711, (Nos. 16-3426, 16-3542), 2016 WL 6831141. 
 35. Id. at 34–35. 
 36. Id. at 14–15. 
 37. Kuhns, 868 F.3d at 716. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 714, 718. 
 40. 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 41. Id. at 766. 
 42. Id. 
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to “harvest” customer payment information as it crossed the network.43  This 
information included customer names, payment card account numbers,44 expi-
ration dates, card verification codes, and personal identification numbers.45  
This type of information is considered PII, and the “harvesting” of that data is 
considered theft.46 
On August 14, 2014, nearly two months after the incident began, Super-
Valu issued a press release notifying customers of the breach and admitting 
that a theft of the data had potentially occurred.47  On September 29, 2014, 
SuperValu announced that a second data breach had occurred after the August 
2014 press release and that a different malicious software had been installed 
on the same network.48  In both announcements, SuperValu acknowledged the 
presence of hostile software on the payment network but downplayed the no-
tion that any data “was in fact stolen” and pledged to investigate the intrusion’s 
scope.49 
Sixteen customers (“Plaintiffs,” collectively), representing a class who 
had purchased goods from SuperValu stores over a four-month period using a 
credit or debit card, filed four separate class actions in federal district courts in 
three states against three corporations that owned and operated thousands of 
SuperValu retail grocery stores across the country (“Defendants,” collec-
tively).50  Defendants moved to centralize the proceedings, and the United 
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered the cases consolidated 
as a single class action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota.51  
In the amended consolidated class action complaint, Plaintiffs sought certifica-
tion of the class, money damages based upon six causes of action,52 injunctive 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. This includes data from both credit and debit cards.  Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 769. 
 47. Id. at 766. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. In re SuperValu, Inc., No. 14-MD-2586 ADM/TNL, 2016 WL 81792, at *1–
2 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded 870 F.3d 763 (8th 
Cir. 2017).  The defendants included: SuperValu Inc., a Fortune 100 corporation head-
quartered in Minnesota and third-largest food retailer in the United States with over 
3,000 stores; AB Acquisitions, LLC, a privately held company headquartered in Idaho 
that owned and operated over 1,000 stores; and New Albertson’s, Inc., a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of AB Acquisitions, LLC.  Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 11–12, 
In re SuperValu, No. 14-MD-2586 ADM/TNL, 2016 WL 81792. 
 51. See In re SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 765. 
 52. Those causes of action included: “(1) violations of state consumer protection 
statutes, (2) violations of state data breach notification statutes, (3) negligence, (4) 
breach of implied contract, (5) negligence per se, and (6) unjust enrichment.”  Id. at 
767. 
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relief,53 and attorneys’ fees and costs.54  Like Kuhns, the district court refused 
to reach the merits of the case and, upon a motion from Defendants, dismissed 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction55 for a “failure to allege facts establishing 
Article III standing.”56  Thus, the primary question on appeal was whether the 
court could find Article III standing based on a substantial and imminent risk 
of harm to customers who had personal data compromised by the data breach.57 
Plaintiffs’ argued that Defendants “failed to take adequate measures to 
protect customers’ Card Information.”58  Plaintiffs first alleged that the data 
breach occurred because Defendants used substandard data security practices59 
that violated industry best practices and heightened the likelihood of a breach.60  
Plaintiffs additionally alleged that because numerous large data breaches had 
occurred targeting retailers, Defendants should have foreseen the vulnerability 
in their security systems and been prepared for an attack.61  Plaintiffs claimed 
that because of Defendants’ substandard practices and lack of foresight, they 
were subjected “to an imminent and real possibility of identity theft” for an 
“extended period of time” because of the long-term vulnerability of financial 
information on the digital black market.62  One named Plaintiff, David Holmes, 
also claimed that a fraudulent charge appeared on his credit card shortly after 
Defendants’ first breach announcement, and in response, he cancelled the card 
and waited two weeks for a replacement.63  Defendants responded that Plain-
tiffs failed to allege that they suffered any actual or impending injuries, that 
any future injuries were “merely speculative,” and that any costs incurred by 
Plaintiffs in protecting against a speculative injury were self-imposed harms.64 
A unanimous three-judge panel for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district 
ruling in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district court for 
 
 53. The injunctive relief sought to enjoin Defendants from continuing the claimed 
“unlawful practices.”  Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra note 50, at 40.  It 
also asked the court to order the defendants to identify all victims and pay damages and 
order Defendants to begin corrective advertising campaigns.  Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). 
 56. See In re SuperValu, Inc., No. 14-MD-2586 ADM/TNL, 2016 WL 81792, at 
*3 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded 870 F.3d 763 (8th 
Cir. 2017). 
 57. In re SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 768. 
 58. Id. at 766. 
 59. Such as easily guessed passwords, failure to lock out users after multiple failed 
login attempts, and no segregation of the network by use of firewalls.  Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 766–67.  The specific threat was that the hackers could use the compro-
mised data to make charges or withdrawals, open new credit accounts, or sell the data 
to third parties who could do the same.  Id. 
 63. Id. at 767. 
 64. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 29–32, In re SuperValu, 870 F.3d 763 (Nos. 
16-2378, 16-2528). 
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further proceedings.65  The Eighth Circuit held that there were insufficient 
claims in the complaint to allege “substantial risk of future identity theft” but 
held that only Holmes, who had claimed a present injury for the fraudulent 
charge on his card, had standing.66  The court noted that a putative class action 
could proceed as long as one named Plaintiff could show standing and con-
cluded that the district court erred in dismissing the action for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.67  The court then affirmed the dismissal for the fifteen other 
Plaintiffs and remanded the case to the district court to consider the merits of 
the Holmes’ claim.68 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Legal solutions for data breaches currently fall into two main categories 
– Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) enforcement actions69 and private suits 
based in tort, contract, or state statute.70  Typically, consumers bring claims 
involving data breaches as federal class action lawsuits,71 as the number of 
potential class members is quite large and the amount of damages that each 
individual expects to recover is quite small.72  Yet, to date, most data breach 
class action cases have been dismissed either due to a plaintiff’s inability to 
show an injury in fact for purposes of standing or failure to state a claim for 
which relief can be granted.73 
The issue of standing has led to a circuit split among the U.S. Courts of 
Appeal for the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits on one 
side and the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits 
on the other.74  The circuit split mostly concerns whether data breach victims 
have standing to sue an entity with the responsibility of securing PII of cus-
tomers.75  Particularly, courts have wrestled with the question of whether a data 
breach constitutes an injury in fact and whether a hypothetical risk of future 
harm (such as potential identity theft) is sufficient for standing purposes.76  
This split has yet to be resolved by the United States Supreme Court, and the 
 
 65. In re SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 774. 
 66. Id. at 768. 
 67. Id. at 768, 774. 
 68. Id. at 774. 
 69. FTC enforcement actions are outside the scope of this Note, which focuses on 
the Eighth Circuit decisions and the issue of Article III standing. 
 70. See David J. Baldwin, Jennifer Penberthy Buckley & D. Ryan Slaugh, Insur-
ing Against Privacy Claims Following a Data Breach, 122 PA. ST. L. REV. 683, 687–
706 (2018). 
 71. Claims are usually brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2018). 
 72. Megan Dowty, Note, Life Is Short. Go to Court: Establishing Article III Stand-
ing in Data Breach Cases, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 686 (2017). 
 73. See discussion infra Sections III.A, IV.A. 
 74. See discussion infra Section III.C. 
 75. See discussion infra Section III.C. 
 76. See discussion infra Section III.C. 
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Court denied a writ of certiorari based on standing in a data breach case in 
2018.77  Section A of this Part discusses the typical elements that plaintiffs in 
a data breach case must prove to establish Article III standing.  This Section 
focuses on the first element of standing: injury in fact.  Next, Section B high-
lights some legal theories plaintiffs have used to substantiate their “injury” af-
ter a data breach.  Finally, Section C examines, in depth, the circuit split on 
standing in data breach cases. 
A. Article III Standing 
Standing is the major hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome when seeking legal 
redress for a data breach.  The doctrine of standing limits the categories of 
litigants who can seek redress for a legal wrong within a jurisdiction to only 
those who have actually suffered injury.78  For a federal case, which includes 
nearly all consumer suits against breached entities, standing is governed by the 
Cases and Controversies Clause of Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.79  Standing may also be created by Congress specifically by statute as 
long as a plaintiff can show he or she suffered concrete harm and not just a 
“bare procedural violation” of that statute.80  The United States Supreme Court 
has interpreted standing numerous times, and the most common articulation of 
the doctrine came from Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,81 which states that the 
“irreducible constitutional minimum” requires plaintiffs to establish that they 
“(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged con-
duct of . . . defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judi-
cial decision.”82 
In data breach cases, the first requirement of standing, injury in fact, is 
the most difficult for plaintiffs to establish.  In fact, for a court to consider the 
second and third elements of standing (causality and redressability), an injury 
in fact must be found “[f]irst and foremost.”83  Courts rarely address the second 
two elements of standing because injury in fact has been so difficult for plain-
tiffs to prove.84  However, when a court has found injury in fact, showing that 
the injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant” is 
relatively straightforward.85  The final element, “redressability,” has been a 
 
 77. CareFirst, Inc. v. Attias, 138 S. Ct. 981, 981 (2018) (mem.). 
 78. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016). 
 79. Id. at 1550. 
 80. See id. at 1549–50. 
 81. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 82. Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Spokeo, 
136 S. Ct. at 1547). 
 83. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 
U.S. 83, 103 (1998)). 
 84. See Dowty, supra note 72, at 695. 
 85. See id. at 694. 
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challenge for plaintiffs in a handful of cases because the nature of the harm is 
often abstract.86 
To prove an injury in fact, the United States Supreme Court has stated 
that plaintiffs must show “‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is 
‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypo-
thetical.’”87  In data breach cases, both the “concrete and particularized” and 
the “actual or imminent” requirements have been difficult to overcome because 
most plaintiffs cannot show that the breach of their PII caused any tangible 
harm.88 
1. “Concrete and Particularized” 
An injury is “particularized” when it “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal 
and individual way.”89  In terms of a data breach, each plaintiff’s “personal 
interests” in the mishandling of their PII is “individualized rather than collec-
tive.”90  However, particularization alone does not establish an injury in fact; 
rather, the “concreteness” of an injury must also be established.91  For an injury 
to be “concrete,” it must “actually exist,” meaning it must be “real[] and not 
abstract.”92  This does not necessarily mean that the injury must be “tangible,” 
as intangible harms can constitute a real harm.93  The United States Supreme 
Court has recently noted that a “risk of real harm,” which is clearly intangible, 
can satisfy the concreteness element.94  For a data breach, in which the primary 
risk of harm is identity theft, “[n]obody doubts that identity theft, should it 
befall one of these plaintiffs, would constitute a concrete and particularized 
injury.”95 
 
 86. See id. at 695. 
 87. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560 (1992)). 
 88. See, e.g., Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 
2015); Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 
664 F.3d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 2011); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th 
Cir. 2010). 
 89. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1549. 
 94. Id.; see also Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 153–55 
(2010) (stating that a “substantial risk” of cross-contamination of crops was sufficient 
injury to find standing). 
 95. Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 
S. Ct. 981 (2018) (mem.). 
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2. “Actual or Imminent” 
The United States Supreme Court recently examined the requirement of 
imminence in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA.96  Without reaching the 
merits of plaintiff’s argument, the Court held that Article III standing was un-
available for a lack of imminence.97  The Court admitted that a threat of a “fu-
ture injury” could be enough to confer Article III standing but only if it is “cer-
tainly impending.”98  However, if the future injury is “speculative” and based 
on a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities,” then it cannot be characterized 
as “imminent.”99  Finding standing in data breach cases has become a more 
challenging hurdle since Clapper because the risk of harm from a data breach 
is often based only on potential identity thefts – an event that has not yet oc-
curred and may not ever occur. 
B. Legal Theories on Which Plaintiffs Have Relied 
Consumers affected by a data breach attempted to use many theories in 
courts to seek remedy for the “harm” of PII exposure.  In the past few years 
alone, plaintiffs have brought suits for “negligence, breach of contract, unjust 
enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, unfair and deceptive business practices, 
invasion of privacy,” and violations of various state and federal statutes.100  
Even when plaintiffs in data breach cases successfully establish standing, few 
claims have resulted in successful relief under common law principles.101  
Courts have been rather consistent in finding that the mere risk of future harm 
from a data security breach does not rise to the level of compensable harm.102  
 
 96. 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
 97. Id. at 422.  In Clapper, plaintiffs were a group of non-profit, legal, and media 
organizations who argued that § 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was 
unconstitutional because it allowed the government wide berth to eavesdrop on their 
communications with overseas contacts.  Id. at 401, 406.  Plaintiffs claimed that there 
was an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that their communications would be inter-
cepted “at some point in the future” and that they would have to travel overseas or cease 
communicating with those contacts to circumvent the potential surveillance.  Id. at 401, 
407. 
 98. Id. at 409. 
 99. Id. at 410. 
 100. Dowty, supra note 72, at 686; see also, e.g., Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 
711 (8th Cir. 2017); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384  (6th Cir. 
2016); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015); Resnick 
v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317  (11th Cir. 2012); In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. 
Breach Litig., No. 16-MD-02752-LHK, 2017 WL 3727318 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2017); 
In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d 953 (N.D. Cal. 2016); In re 
Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1158 (D. Minn. 2014). 
 101. See Elizabeth T. Isaacs, Comment, Exposure Without Redress: A Proposed 
Remedial Tool for the Victims Who Were Set Aside, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 519, 522 (2015). 
 102. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability for Risk of Future Identity Theft, 50 
A.L.R. 6th 33, § 6, West (database updated weekly). 
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Even if damages could be proven, problems exist with proving causation.  
Plaintiffs must show that identity theft or other ill-begotten use of PII was 
caused by the data breach in question and not by some prior breach or lawful 
dissemination of the data.103 
C. The Circuit Split 
The U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and District of 
Columbia Circuits have consistently been the most likely to find standing in 
data breach cases.  These circuits have allowed victims of a data breach to sue 
when PII is merely exposed to hackers and there is not yet evidence of fraudu-
lent credit card charges104 or the hackers’ understanding of the data they 
breached.105  The Third, Fourth, and (now) Eighth Circuits have applied more 
scrutiny to plaintiffs seeking standing in data breach cases.  In these circuits, 
plaintiffs must do more than merely allege that PII was exposed to hackers.  
These circuits have required evidence that the breached data was actually used 
to the detriment of the victims or that the breaching party understood the value 
of the data and had actual plans to misuse it. 
1. Circuits More Likely to Find Standing: Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and 
District of Columbia 
The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits have inter-
preted standing requirements for plaintiffs affected by a data breach more lib-
erally.  First, each circuit has found that PII exposed in a data breach signifies 
some future risk of “concrete” harm of identity theft.  Second, each circuit has 
found that costs incurred by consumers seeking to mitigate that future harm is 
not self-inflicted and constitutes either an injury in fact or some measure of 
redressable damages.  Finally, each circuit has found that the imminence issue 
from Clapper does not pose a substantial barrier to the claims of future harm. 
The Sixth Circuit recently found standing for customers of an insurance 
company that had over 1.1 million records containing PII compromised.106  
The Sixth Circuit analyzed the risk of the future harm standard laid out in Clap-
per and determined that “[w]here a data breach targets personal information, a 
reasonable inference can be drawn that the hackers will use the victims’ data 
for . . . fraudulent purposes . . . .”107  The court further stated that there was “no 
need for speculation” when data had been allegedly stolen and was “in the 
 
 103. See Isaacs, supra note 101, at 543–44. 
 104. See, e.g., Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 966–69 (7th 
Cir. 2016). 
 105. See, e.g., In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 
996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 962 (S.D. Cal. 2014). 
 106. Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 385–86 (6th Cir. 
2016). 
 107. Id. at 388. 
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hands of ill-intentioned criminals.”108  Rejecting the argument that credit mon-
itoring costs were “self-inflicted” in anticipation of non-imminent harm, the 
court reasoned that the continuing risk of identity theft and the tangible costs 
of monitoring financial accounts for unauthorized activity constituted a 
harm.109  The court placed an emphasis on the fact that the insurance company 
explicitly suggested that consumers affected by the breach actively monitor 
their accounts, which seemed to contravene the company’s argument that the 
harm was not “concrete.”110 
The Seventh Circuit recently reaffirmed its liberal theory of standing for 
consumers affected by a credit card data breach in Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s 
China Bistro, Inc.111  Two plaintiffs brought suit, one claiming fraudulent 
charges had appeared on a debit card shortly after eating at a P.F. Chang’s res-
taurant and the other claiming he suffered harm by spending time monitoring 
his credit report and card statements after the announcement of the breach, alt-
hough he did not suffer any fraudulent charges.112  The court found both plain-
tiffs had standing.113  The court determined that it was “plausible to infer a 
substantial risk of harm from the data breach[] because a primary incentive for 
hackers is ‘sooner or later[ ] to make fraudulent charges or assume those con-
sumers’ identities.’”114  Regarding the immediacy requirement, the court ob-
served that because the breach had already occurred, the risk of identity theft 
and fraudulent charges was “sufficiently immediate to justify mitigation ef-
forts.”115  The court concluded that “time and money spent resolving fraudulent 
charges [were] cognizable injuries for Article III standing.”116 
In Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., the Ninth Circuit found standing for 
97,000 Starbucks employees whose unencrypted names, addresses, and social 
security numbers were stored on a stolen laptop computer.117  Starbucks sent 
notice to the affected employees and offered free credit monitoring services.118  
Despite the fact that none of the employees suffered any financial loss, the 
Ninth Circuit held that they suffered an injury in fact because they experienced 
“a credible threat of harm” that was “both real and immediate.”119  The court 
held “that [individuals] whose personal information [had] been stolen but not 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 388–89. 
 110. See id. at 389. 
 111. 819 F.3d 963, 965 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 970. 
 114. Id. at 967 (alteration in original) (quoting Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 
LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 967. 
 117. 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 118. Id. at 1140–41. 
 119. Id. at 1143. 
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misused[] [had] suffered an injury sufficient to confer standing . . . .”120  Alt-
hough the Krottner case was decided before Clapper’s apparent narrowing of 
the imminence requirement in 2013, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of California later adhered to Krottner’s reasoning when it found that 
an injury in fact occurred simply because hackers breached a system containing 
PII and could have accessed the information in In re Sony Gaming Networks 
in 2014.121 
In Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., the District of Columbia Circuit held that ap-
proximately one million customers of a health insurance company whose PII 
was subjected to a breach had plausibly alleged a substantial enough risk of 
future injury to create Article III standing.122  The court stated that “the proper 
way to analyze an increased-risk-of-harm claim is to consider the ultimate al-
leged harm . . . as the concrete and particularized injury and then to determine 
whether the increased risk of such harm makes injury to an individual citizen 
sufficiently imminent for standing purposes.”123  Agreeing with plaintiffs that 
identity theft constituted a “concrete and particularized injury” and that the na-
ture of the information breached could plausibly create a “substantial risk of 
identity fraud,” the court found that plaintiffs satisfied Clapper’s imminence 
test.124  Finally, the court addressed redressability by considering the costs in-
curred by plaintiffs to “mitigate or avoid [the] harm” of identity theft and found 
that any money spent could be reimbursed to make plaintiffs whole.125 
2. Circuits Less Likely to Grant Relief: Third, Fourth, and Eighth 
The Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have been more resistant in finding 
standing for plaintiffs in a data breach case.  The Third and Fourth Circuits, in 
particular, have placed significant roadblocks in front of plaintiffs by rejecting 
allegations of “hypothetical, future injur[ies]” and finding plaintiffs’ concerns 
 
 120. Id. at 1140. 
 121. See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. 
Supp. 2d 942, 962 (S.D. Cal. 2014); see also In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 
F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1214–15 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (finding standing when hackers accessed 
credit card information despite no allegations of misuse).  But see In re Zappos.com, 
Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 958–59 (D. Nev. 2015) (holding that the immanency require-
ment was not met because there was no evidence of misuse three years after the breach 
and the passage of time showed no “substantial risk” of harm). 
 122. 865 F.3d 620, 622–23, 626 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 981 
(2018) (mem.). 
 123. Id. at 627 (quoting Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 915 
(D.C. Cir. 2015)).  
 124. Id. at 628–29. 
 125. Id. at 629. 
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about potential identity theft to not be “imminent” enough to warrant stand-
ing.126  As described infra, the Eighth Circuit has found standing in limited 
circumstances but has rejected plaintiff claims of compensable harm.127 
The leading case in the Third Circuit as of the time this Note was written 
is Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.128  In Reilly, a payment processor that collected 
employees PII to issue paychecks for over 1,900 companies suffered a security 
breach, but it was unclear if the hacker “read, copied, or understood the 
data.”129  The court held that the allegations of “hypothetical, future injury” 
were insufficient to confer standing.130  Noting that it was pure speculation to 
determine if the hacker actually was aware of the data it accessed, if the hacker 
intended to commit any future criminal acts with the information, and if the 
information itself could be used to the detriment of plaintiffs, the court rejected 
any claim of harm.131  The court further dismissed the notion that “incurred 
expenses in anticipation of future harm,” such as spending time, effort, and 
money on credit monitoring, were sufficient to confer standing.132  The court 
did not completely close the door to future suits and suggested, in dicta, that if 
it could be shown that breached information “[was] actually read, copied, un-
derstood, and misused to a plaintiff’s detriment,” standing would be availa-
ble.133 
The Fourth Circuit likely has the least plaintiff-friendly interpretation of 
the standing doctrine in data breach cases, as shown in its comprehensive de-
nial of standing in Beck v. McDonald.134  In Beck, a laptop from a veteran’s 
hospital containing unencrypted PII of 7,400 patients went missing and was 
considered stolen.135  Plaintiffs, Veterans Affairs (“VA”) patients, brought 
claims against the Secretary of VA, alleging federal statutory violations136 and 
an increased risk of harm for future identity theft.137  Plaintiffs also claimed 
mitigation costs because they had to “frequently monitor their credit reports, 
bank statements, health insurance reports, and other similar information, pur-
chas[e] credit watch services, and [shift] financial accounts.”138 
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with both claims and distinguished the de-
cisions from the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits that had found standing 
 
 126. See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 41, 46 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 127. See infra Part IV. 
 128. 664 F.3d at 38. 
 129. Id. at 40. 
 130. Id. at 42. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 46. 
 133. Id. at 45. 
 134. See 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Beck v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct. 
2307 (2017) (mem.). 
 135. Id. at 267. 
 136. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Administrative 
Procedure Act.  Id. at 266. 
 137. Id. at 266–67. 
 138. Id. at 267 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
15
Wynhausen: Eighth Circuit Further Complicates
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
312 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
after a data breach based on factual differences.139  Analyzing the “imminence” 
prong in light of Clapper, the Beck court found plaintiffs’ claims too specula-
tive and attenuated because, in the three years that had passed since the laptop 
was stolen, plaintiffs were unable to produce evidence showing that their PII 
had been accessed or misused or that they had suffered from identity theft.140  
To find harm of future identity theft, the court said it would have to construct 
an “attenuated chain of possibilities,” which the Clapper court expressly re-
jected.141  Then, regarding “substantial risk” of future harm, the court rejected 
an argument by plaintiffs that thirty-three percent of data breaches result in 
victims of identity theft by pointing out that the number was just a “general 
statistic” that had little bearing on the unique facts of the case at hand.142  Fur-
ther, unlike the other circuits, the court “decline[d] to infer a substantial risk of 
harm of future identity theft” because of the VA’s offer to provide credit mon-
itoring services.143  The court reasoned that making such a ruling may discour-
age companies subject to a future breach from offering to provide such credit 
monitoring services.144  Finally, the court rejected the mitigation costs argu-
ment by stating that “self-imposed harms cannot confer standing.”145 
IV. INSTANT DECISIONS 
The two separate Eighth Circuit panels in Kuhns and In re SuperValu each 
found limited standing for Plaintiffs but for completely different reasons.  Ad-
ditionally, each panel chose a different path when determining redressability 
for Plaintiffs.  This Part will first examine the outcome in Kuhns; next, it will 
examine In re SuperValu. 
A. Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc. 
Citing Eighth Circuit precedent,146 the court concluded that Kuhns had 
standing for his contract-related claims because “he did not receive the full 
benefit of his bargain with Scottrade.”147  The court affirmed that “a party to a 
breached contract has a judicially cognizable interest for standing purposes, 
regardless of the merits of the breach alleged.”148  Because a portion of the fees 
 
 139. Id. at 273, 276. 
 140. Id. at 274–75. 
 141. Id. at 275 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 588 U.S. 398, 410 (2013)). 
 142. Id. at 275–76, 276 n.7. 
 143. Id. at 276. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 276–77. 
 146. Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 833 F.3d 903, 909 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding that a 
company’s privacy policy contained within terms of service created a contractual rela-
tionship that was breached when the company shared confidential personal information 
with third parties). 
 147. Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 148. Id. (quoting Carlsen, 833 F.3d at 909). 
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for brokerage services were used to meet Scottrade’s “contractual obligations 
to provide data management and security,” the breach of those obligations 
meant those services were diminished in value.149  The court held that this was 
enough of a “concrete and particularized” allegation of breach of contract to 
confer “actual” injury.150 
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision in Kuhns de novo 
because Scottrade made a successful summary judgment motion on stand-
ing.151  Kuhns alleged that standing existed because he faced “an immediate 
and continuing increased risk of identity theft;” incurred mitigation costs; “re-
ceived Brokerage Agreement services diminished in value” and therefore did 
not receive the full benefit of the bargain; suffered harm from the decline in 
value of PII; and suffered an invasion of privacy.152  In determining standing, 
the court – somewhat paradoxically – ignored all the claims but the benefit of 
the bargain claim.153 
The next question addressed by the court was whether to dismiss the case 
for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted.154  The court ana-
lyzed each of Kuhn’s four claims for relief individually but ultimately rejected 
all of them.155  First, the court considered a claim for breach of express con-
tract.156  Noting that the complaint neither identified any actual misrepresenta-
tions nor “applicable [data security] law and regulation” breached by Scottrade, 
the court concluded that Kuhns’ “bare assertions” of a failure to protect cus-
tomer PII were not plausible enough to allege “actual damage.”157  The court 
also observed that the express terms of the contract did not appear to contem-
plate data management or security.158  The court concluded that because no 
fraud or identity theft had resulted from stolen PII in the two years since the 
breach was identified, it was inappropriate to base massive class action litiga-
tion on mere “allegations of worry and inconvenience.”159 
Second, the court dismissed Kuhn’s claim of implied breach of contract 
for a failure to allege a plausible claim.160  Despite the brokerage agreement 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 715.  The court noted that Kuhns had filed to voluntarily dismiss the case 
after fully briefing the court and prior to oral arguments because of another action on 
the matter that was proceeding in California state court; however, the court considered 
the motion untimely and proceeded.  Id. at 715, 719. 
 152. Id. at 715. 
 153. See id. at 716. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 717–19.  The four claims were: (1) breach of express contract; (2) breach 
of implied contract and unjust enrichment; (3) declaratory relief; and (4) breach of the 
MMPA, a consumer protection statute.  Id. 
 156. Id. at 717–18. 
 157. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 
 158. Id. at 718. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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containing language that the company utilized “industry leading” security 
measures, the court declined to speculate about whether it implied an additional 
contract term because of a lack of any cognizable industry standard.161  Third, 
the court dismissed Kuhn’s claim for declaratory relief that Scottrade “stop its 
illegal practices” because it concluded the claim was “virtually unintelligible” 
and only “focuse[d] on past conduct . . . not on Scottrade’s current prac-
tices.”162  Finally, the court dismissed Kuhn’s fraud claim under the Missouri 
Merchandising Practices Act (“MMPA”) because it found that the statute only 
covered fraud in relation to the “sale of merchandise.”163  Noting that intangi-
ble services can qualify as merchandise, the court further determined that Scot-
trade was selling brokerage services, not data security services, and that any 
customers’ transfer of PII was “voluntarily transfer[ed]” to obtain access to 
those brokerage services.164 
B. In re SuperValu, Inc. 
This case was also reviewed de novo by the Eighth Circuit.165  The main 
question for the court in In re SuperValu was whether Plaintiffs had adequately 
alleged a “‘certainly impending’ or ‘substantial risk’ of identity theft as a result 
of the data breaches.”166  The court began by dismissing standing-based argu-
ments from the Sixth, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits by claiming 
that the facts were distinguishable.167  It then agreed that the facts supported a 
conclusion that the hackers actually stole credit card information from Plain-
tiffs and had not merely gained access to the data.168  The court then observed 
that only Holmes alleged any fraudulent transactions on a financial account and 
that the other Plaintiffs’ allegations rested “on information and belief [that] il-
licit websites [were] selling their Card Information to counterfeiters and fraud-
sters.”169  The court considered these allegations to be too speculative rather 
than “certainly impending” and concluded that Plaintiffs failed to show any 
injury.170 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 718–19. 
 164. Id. at 719. 
 165. In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 166. Id. at 769. 
 167. See id.  The court did not elaborate on the factual differences between the cases 
in sister circuits and the case at hand.  See id.  However, the cases cited by the court 
here included instances in which PII was compromised from two separate insurance 
databases, a healthcare database, and malware installed on two separate point-of-sale 
systems.  See id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 769–70. 
 170. Id. 
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After concluding that identity theft “constitutes an actual, concrete, and 
particularized injury,” the court next determined whether the mere risk of fu-
ture identity theft could be considered “substantial.”171  The court examined 
the nature of the data stolen: credit card information.172  Credit card infor-
mation typically does not accompany any sensitive PII and “generally cannot 
be used alone to open unauthorized new accounts.”173  Concluding that there 
was “little to no risk” that fraudulent accounts could be opened in the name of 
Plaintiffs, the court held that the mere theft of the information did not create a 
substantial enough risk to constitute injury in fact.174  The court then went a 
step further and addressed the mitigation costs borne by Plaintiffs, holding that 
“[b]ecause [P]laintiffs have not alleged a substantial risk of future identity 
theft, the time they spent protecting themselves against this speculative threat 
cannot create an injury.”175  Thus, standing was denied for all Plaintiffs who 
merely alleged a future risk of harm.176 
For Holmes – the named Plaintiff who alleged present injury – however, 
the court was more lenient.  Stating that “the misuse of Holmes’ Card Infor-
mation is credit card fraud and thus a form of identity theft,” the court answered 
whether the complaint had alleged sufficient causation to link the breach to the 
fraud in the affirmative.177  Defendants argued that the present harm theory 
should be dismissed because it had not been argued in the complaint.178  How-
ever, the court noted that “it is unnecessary to set out a legal theory for . . . 
[P]laintiff’s claim for relief in a pleading” so long as the alleged facts demon-
strate actual injury.179  The court then analyzed four elements to determine po-
tential causation: (1) Defendants failed to secure the data on their network, (2) 
the network was subsequently hacked, (3) the data was stolen by hackers, and 
(4) Holmes became a victim of identity theft after the breaches.180  The court 
stated that Holmes met his “modest” burden of alleging that the fraudulent 
charge was “fairly traceable” to Defendants’ breach.181 
Defendants next argued that even if Holmes had alleged standing for a 
present injury, his allegation was insufficient to provide standing for the rest of 
 
 171. Id. at 770. 
 172. Id. at 770–71. 
 173. Id. at 770 (quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-737, 
PERSONAL INFORMATION: DATA BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF 
RESULTING IDENTITY THEFT IS LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE FULL EXTENT IS UNKNOWN 30 
(2007)).  To be classified as PII, the data would have to be similar to “social security 
numbers, birth dates, and driver’s license numbers.”  See id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 771. 
 176. Id. at 771–72. 
 177. Id. at 772–73. 
 178. Id. at 772. 
 179. Id. (quoting Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346, 347 (2014)). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
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the class, who had only alleged risk of future harm without evidence of “wide-
spread misuse.”182  The court held that each class member’s standing must be 
“assessed individually” and that it was error to make Holmes’ standing depend-
ent on the standing of other named and unnamed Plaintiffs.183  The court stated, 
“To the extent Holmes can show that the fraudulent charge was unreimbursed, 
such financial harm would be compensable in this action.”184  Thus, this panel 
of the Eighth Circuit forged its own path in the circuit split by finding standing 
for a present injury while rejecting any claim for potential future injury even 
though Plaintiffs had incurred mitigation costs in response to the breach.185 
V. COMMENT 
This Part proceeds in three Sections.  Section A discusses the contribu-
tions of Kuhns and In re SuperValu to current law in data breach cases.  Section 
B discusses what plaintiffs filing a case in the Eighth Circuit should consider 
before bringing a data breach case.  Finally, Section C concludes with thoughts 
on expected changes in the law regarding data breach litigation. 
A. The State of the Law After Kuhns and In re SuperValu 
The Eighth Circuit’s contribution to the panoply of law surrounding data 
breaches is further proof that the United States Supreme Court needs to revisit 
its voluminous Article III standing jurisprudence and articulate a new doctrine 
for the digital age.  The series of decisions since Lujan have only further ob-
scured the meaning of injury in fact.  The divergent course of the circuits pro-
vides clear evidence of this confusion.  For instance, some circuits have no 
problem finding harm from mitigation costs borne by plaintiffs when a data 
breach occurs, while others consider such costs to be a self-imposed harm.186  
Some circuits agree that the risk of future harm from compromised PII is suf-
ficient to find standing, while others believe it is too speculative.187 
The Eighth Circuit’s decisions are curious because the court found stand-
ing but ultimately rejected both mitigation costs and risk of future harm as in-
juries.188  Therefore, it effectively shut the door on any recovery for plaintiffs 
unless they can prove actual identity theft.  Tracing identity theft to a particular 
breach is a problem in itself, particularly as more and more sources containing 
sensitive PII are breached.  Restricting plaintiff recovery to actual, traceable 
 
 182. Id. at 772–73.  The district court had accepted this argument in its opinion for 
dismissal.  Id. at 773. 
 183. Id. at 773. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See id. at 774. 
 186. See supra Section III.C. 
 187. See supra Section III.C. 
 188. See supra Part IV. 
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identity theft may make it nearly impossible for Eighth Circuit plaintiffs to ob-
tain standing if their data is subject to breach.  This will likely reduce the num-
ber of cases brought in the Eighth Circuit, as putative plaintiffs will likely seek 
the more favorable jurisdictions of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. 
The Kuhns decision is particularly vexing.  The court found standing on 
a contract theory but then rejected any compensable harm for breach of that 
contract.189  Nearly every online service contains some sort of privacy policy 
that could be interpreted as forming an implied contract.  If any payment is 
made for those services, then customers whose data is breached lose the “ben-
efit of the bargain” in the form of diminished value for those services.  By 
dismissing Kuhns’ claims for failure to state a claim for which relief could be 
granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the bar set for 
plaintiffs was raised even higher. 
After Kuhns, plaintiffs who paid a service fee with an associated privacy 
policy will likely be found to have standing in the event of a breach but will 
still be ineligible for any recovery based on any risk of future harm.  Parties 
that have been subject to a data breach need only to take steps to mitigate future 
harm, such as notifying its customers or providing credit monitoring services, 
to reduce their potential liability.  These mitigation steps may keep the problem 
from worsening, but these steps do not put customers in the same position that 
they were before the breach occurred, and the breach of contract would go 
without remedy. 
The United States Supreme Court denied writ of certiorari in Attias v. 
CareFirst, Inc.,190 leaving the decisions in both Kuhns and In re SuperValu as 
the most recent statement on data breach jurisprudence in the Eighth Circuit as 
of the time this Note was written.  The two decisions tilt the weight of the 
majority of circuits in favor of finding no compensable relief for risk of future 
harm when a breach occurs.191  Most circuits seem content to follow their own 
precedents at the moment.192  Until the Court grants a writ of certiorari in a 
data breach case, Congress takes action to address the issue, or the FTC en-
gages in significant rulemaking, few major changes can be expected in data 
breach jurisprudence. 
B. Considerations When Bringing Data Breach Suits in the Eighth Cir-
cuit 
Lawyers representing plaintiffs who seek standing and recovery for a data 
breach action should make sure to follow a few basic principles.  First, they 
should make sure that plaintiffs have a credible allegation of identity theft that 
is somehow traceable to the data breach.  The record is littered with dismissed 
 
 189. See supra Section IV.A. 
 190. 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 981 (2018) (mem.). 
 191. See supra Section III.C. 
 192. See supra Section III.C. 
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cases because plaintiffs could only claim some speculative future harm.193  Al-
legations of identity theft not only are important for finding standing but are 
also likely needed for any chance of damage recovery.194  The decisions in 
Kuhns and In re SuperValu have shown that the mere risk of identity theft is 
not enough. 
Second, other forms of relief may be available – i.e., prospective relief, 
such as credit monitoring or an injunction mandating security improve-
ments.195  A settlement that includes injunctive relief may have greater value 
than a settlement granting relief in the form of identity theft damages alone.196  
Third, it is important to consider other parties that may have some share in the 
liability, such as third-party vendors.197  If another party has a share of the re-
sponsibility for the breach, it may increase the pressure on defendants to reach 
a settlement, as one party would no longer bear the brunt of any damages.198  
Finally, attorneys should consider both common law and statutory claims, as 
many states have created a private cause of action for litigants in the event of 
a breach of PII.199  While the odds are stacked against recovery of actual pecu-
niary damages for plaintiffs in the Eighth Circuit, some courts have been will-
ing to grant some varieties of relief,200 and settlement options may make it 
worth an attorney’s time. 
C. Inching Towards a Solution 
As long as the bulk of consumer claims against breached entities fail, little 
incentive exists for institutional changes in data management policies to be 
made.  Parties holding PII may be aware that improper stewardship of data may 
bring about FTC enforcement, but limited agency resources can only focus on 
the most egregious violators.201  Yet, as the risks of data breaches become more 
 
 193. See, e.g., Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 271–72 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub 
nom. Beck v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct. 2307 (2017) (mem.); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 
F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 194. See Aaron Blumenthal & Andre M. Mura, In the Breach, TRIAL, Sept. 2017, 
at 30, 31–32. 
 195. Id. at 32. 
 196. For instance, settlements with Adobe and Target after a data breach derived 
nearly all value from injunctive mandates, such as regular auditing, system monitoring, 
and employee security training.  Id. at 32.  For attorneys litigating a case, this value 
becomes calculated in the eventual costs billed to the losing party. 
 197. Id. at 32–33. 
 198. Id. at 33. 
 199. At least thirteen states have passed legislation requiring certain standards for 
how private data stewards can manage to collect data about residents.  For a list of these 
statutes, see Data Security Laws: Private Sector, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 15, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-
and-information-technology/data-security-laws.aspx. 
 200. See Blumenthal & Mura, supra note 194, at 32–33. 
 201. See Baldwin, Buckley, & Slaugh, supra note 70, at 703–05. 
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public, and when a major settlement or judgment is rendered against a data 
steward, there will likely be a rapid shift towards self-regulation within the 
industry. 
Holders of PII will need a clear understanding of exactly what is being 
collected, how it is being stored, and what security measures are being em-
ployed.  Data minimization strategies202 will be more likely employed, and PII 
that may induce monetary liability might be encrypted or deleted in order to 
avoid potential liability.  Emerging technologies, such as encrypted signatures, 
may have to replace a social security number, date-of-birth, mother’s maiden 
name, and driver’s license number as a means of verification.  Also, because 
of decisions like Kuhns, privacy policies and promises made to consumers will 
likely be changed to avoid giving plaintiffs a potential cause of action.   
Some commenters have argued for the creation of a negligence cause of 
action called the “negligent enablement of cybercrime,” which could be di-
rected at entities who produce “defective products and services that pave the 
way for third party cybercriminals who exploit known vulnerabilities.”203  This 
new cause of action would create “a modified duty of care on the part of soft-
ware licensors to incorporate reasonable security into their products and ser-
vices.”204  These commentators suggest the new tort would likely need to be 
created by statute and would need to be based on existing principles of warran-
ties, premises liability, and negligence-based products liability from the Uni-
form Commercial Code.205  The development of a new standard would not be 
easy, but there are examples of successful implementation of similar standards 
in the Payment Card Industry (“PCI”).206  Lessons could be drawn from this 
relatively recent, successful implementation of a new standard that was imple-
mented by industry actors instead of by government fiat.207  It is clear, how-
ever, that the existing causes of action are insufficient for granting relief to 
those harmed by a data breach. 
 
 202. Data minimization is the process of removing or destroying unnecessary data 
from vulnerable locations.  Sona R. Makker, Overcoming “Foggy” Notions of Privacy: 
How Data Minimization Will Enable Privacy in the Internet of Things, 85 UMKC L. 
REV. 895, 903 (2017). 
 203. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement 
of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1553, 1553 (2005). 
 204. Id. at 1557. 
 205. Id. at 1558, 1594.  Premises liability is built on the idea that those who are 
aware of dangerous conditions upon their premises and take no immediate steps to fix 
the conditions are liable for the consequences.  Id. at 1581–82.  In terms of software, 
this would mean failure to patch known vulnerabilities in defective code.  Id. at 1582. 
 206. The standard is called Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (“PCI 
DDS”) and was “developed to encourage and enhance cardholder data security and 
facilitate the broad adoption of consistent data security measures globally.”  John A. 
Fisher, Note, Secure My Data or Pay the Price: Consumer Remedy for the Negligent 
Enablement of Data Breach, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 215, 226 (2013). 
 207. For instance, the development of the PCI standards came through a collabora-
tive effort between the major payment card companies and is governed by representa-
tives from each participating member.  See About Us, PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, 
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The issue has remained at the forefront of the national conversation.  In 
November 2018, Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon announced draft legislation 
that would “empower consumers to control their personal information, create 
radical transparency into how corporations use and share their data, and impose 
harsh fines and prison terms for executives at corporations that misuse Ameri-
cans’ data.”208  The bill, titled the “Consumer Data Protection Act,”209 pro-
posed to strengthen the authority of the FTC, giving it broad new powers to be 
“an effective cop on the beat.”210  The draft language would empower the FTC 
to establish minimum privacy and cybersecurity standards, issue steep fines 
and criminal penalties when those standards are broken, create a national “Do 
Not Track” system that allows consumers to restrict what third party companies 
can do with PII, give consumers a system to review which companies have 
their PII and how it is used, and require companies that have consumer PII to 
review how that data is managed.211 
Senator Wyden’s draft bill is ambitious, but it stands little chance of be-
coming law as it is written.  Current political headwinds blow against an ex-
pansion of the administrative state.  Not to mention the scope of the proposed 
sanctions for certain data breaches is troubling.212  Also, it would take many 
years for the FTC to build out its enforcement mechanisms, during which time 
the provisions of the bill would likely be under constant challenge in federal 
court.  The case law surrounding data breaches makes it clear that the judiciary 
will not be arriving at a unified solution unless the United States Supreme Court 
finally grants certiorari in a data breach case.  Senator Wyden’s bill (and other 
federal bills like it)213 are necessary parts of the puzzle.  A proposed legislative 
fix stakes out the parameters of the problem and signals to both companies that 
hold consumer PII and to the public at large that the status quo is untenable.  
 
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/about_us/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).  While the 
number of entities that control or manage potentially sensitive consumer PII is far larger 
than the limited number of payment card processors, the PCI model shows that collab-
orative efforts among stakeholders can be effective at creating a self-regulatory envi-
ronment. 
 208. Press Release, Ron Wyden, Wyden Releases Discussion Draft of Legislation 
to Provide Real Protections for Americans’ Privacy (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.wy-
den.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-releases-discussion-draft-of-legislation-to-
provide-real-protections-for-americans-privacy. 
 209. S. 2188, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 210. Wyden, supra note 208. 
 211. Id. 
 212. For instance, the bill considers the imposition of penalties of up to four percent 
of annual revenue for a company who breaches the standards on the first offense alone.  
Id.  The law would also sanction criminal penalties for senior executives of up to twenty 
years.  Id. 
 213. Data privacy bills are regularly introduced in both Houses of Congress, but 
they rarely (if ever) escape from the committee process.  See, e.g., American Data Dis-
semination Act of 2019, S. 142, 116th Cong. §1 (2019); Data Care Act of 2018, S. 
3744, 115th Cong. §2 (2018); Cyber Privacy Fortification Act of 2015, H.R. 104, 114th 
Cong. §1 (2015). 
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The failure of Congress to pass any of the comprehensive data privacy bills 
proposed in the past few years does not bode well for Senator Wyden’s current 
iteration, but with each subsequent mass data breach, the pressure for Congress 
to act rises. 
A better solution would take a page from the promulgation of the PCI 
standards.  Industry leaders should work together to establish what the stand-
ards for security of consumer PII should be in each sector.  Instead of relying 
on the FTC to create a new standard out of whole cloth, as proposed in the 
Wyden bill, Congress should work with stakeholders to develop standards for 
the collection and management of consumer PII so that enforcement is not so 
reliant on FTC action.  A statute that clearly spells out when the victim of a 
data breach has standing to pursue a private right of action would give the FTC 
some improved tools for enforcement against entities that refuse to adhere to 
the industry defined standards, set commonsense penalties for those who neg-
ligently allow data breaches to occur, and acknowledge that the difficulties of 
complete data protection would be a more complete effort.  Relying solely 
upon the courts to solve the mess caused by the thousands of data breaches that 
occur each year will not yield a workable solution for quite some time. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The current state of the law regarding data breaches is, quite frankly, all 
over the place – as evidenced by the enormous volume of cases concerning the 
matter.  Organizations that suffer a breach may be liable to the FTC, state gov-
ernments, and consumers in private actions.214  This uncertainty is enormously 
inefficient and frustrating for plaintiffs’ attorneys who may wish to pursue a 
case.  Consumers have used a scattershot of legal actions to seek redress and 
have largely come up empty.215  The results in Kuhns and In re SuperValu 
provide further examples of this chaos.216  Few changes to the legal framework 
appear to be on the horizon unless Congress takes action, the FTC engages in 
significant regulatory rulemaking, or the United States Supreme Court agrees 
to take a case on the matter.  The value of a person’s PII diminishes each time 
a major breach occurs, and eventually, the market may simply have to develop 
better methods of verifying identity.  Privacy of PII, at least as it has come to 
be understood, appears to have become a casualty of the digital age; and the 








 214. See supra Part III. 
 215. See supra Section III.B. 
 216. See supra Part IV. 
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